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In daily life, we do not just move independently from how others move. Rather, the
way we move conveys information about our cognitive and affective attitudes toward
our conspecifics. However, the implicit social substrate of our movements is not
easy to capture and isolate given the complexity of human interactive behaviors. In
this perspective article we discuss the crucial conditions for exploring the impact of
“interpersonal” cognitive/emotional dimensions on the motor behavior of individuals
interacting in realistic contexts. We argue that testing interactions requires one to build
up naturalistic and yet controlled scenarios where participants reciprocally adapt their
movements in order to achieve an overarching “shared goal.” We suggest that a shared
goal is what singles out real interactions from situations where two or more individuals
contingently but independently act next to each other, and that “interpersonal” socio-
emotional dimensions might fail to affect co-agents’ behaviors if real interactions are not
at place. We report the results of a novel joint-grasping task suitable for exploring how
individual sub-goals (i.e., correctly grasping an object) relate to, and depend from, the
representation of “shared goals.”
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Introduction
“The difference between a helping hand and an outstretched palm is a twist of the wrist”
L. Leamer, King of the Night.
In order to explore the neuro-cognitive bases of interpersonal encounters, social neuroscience
needs to shift from “isolation paradigms” (Becchio et al., 2010), which investigate “offline” social
cognition from the point of view of a (passive) observer (Pfeiffer et al., 2013), to an active, “second-
person” approach (Schilbach et al., 2013), which validates the idea that—in real life—“online” social
interaction is much more than just the concurrent recruitment of the essentially isolated social
knowledge of individuals (see also Gallotti and Frith, 2013). This implies adopting experimental
set-ups that (i) explore the emergence of closed-loop processes (i.e., allowing partners’ reciprocal
adjustments during the interaction), and (ii) take into account the emotional engagement that
characterizes social encounters (Schilbach et al., 2013).
This issue becomes essential when studying “joint actions (JAs),” which we refer to here,
defined as activities involving two or more individuals who need to coordinate their actions in
time and space with the aim to realize together a desired change in the environment (Sebanz
et al., 2006). This scenario requires dynamic experimental paradigms where the agent’s individual
goal is inherently linked to that of a partner thus depending on mutual adjustments, and where
participants perceive themselves as a “couple” which is acting together as a unity because they
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share an overarching common goal. In the present perspective
article we suggest that only such experimental paradigms
will allow scholars to study the “socio-emotional nature” of
interpersonal coordination and will create a context suitable for
exploring whether, and how, socio-emotional variables impact the
quality of the interaction. We will focus on on-line interactions
that—in our view—best highlight why mutual adjustments are
based on shared goals. Indeed, while in turn-taking situations
each individual is “passive” at some point during the interaction,
on-line interactions require synchronicity in space and time:
thus, they require that co-agents actively understand the partner’
behavior and predict his/her action goal while also monitoring
their own action execution. This situation requires adapting one’s
own action goal to a shared representation of the interaction. This
is not a mere difference in complexity, but it is a difference in
quality: without the constraint of synchronicity, the interaction
may reproduce a condition where one individual is a passive
observer.
In what follows, we try and provide an experimentally useful
definition of “shared goals,” andwe describewhywe believe shared
goals single out JAs from situations where an agent passively
observes or mechanically react to the actions of other individuals.
Then, we will operationalize how shared goals can be investigated
in awell-controlled interactive task and explainwhy the analysis of
kinematics in general (see, for instance Noy et al., 2011; D’Ausilio
et al., 2012; Vesper et al., 2013; Vesper and Richardson, 2014) and
grasping kinematics in particular (Georgiou et al., 2007; Becchio
et al., 2008a,b; Sartori et al., 2009) might be a powerful instrument
to explore the neuro-cognitive instantiations of shared goals.
Thus, we will describe a set-up that we specifically designed to
investigate the relation between individual and joint goals during
an interactive grasping task (Sacheli et al., 2012, 2013, 2015).
Our studies provide empirical evidence that motor tasks that
include shared goals are suitable for exploring the impact of the
socio-emotional context on planned interpersonal coordination.
Defining Shared Goals
Although there is evidence of “proto” forms of cooperative
activities in non-human species (Mendres and de Waal, 2000;
Seed et al., 2008; Plotnik et al., 2011), studies suggest that
the tendency to interact and pursue common goals is typically
human and shows up early in development (Tomasello et al.,
2005; Warneken et al., 2006). Importantly, the tendency to share
goals and intentions with others might support the establishment
of social bonds: the efficacy of the interaction itself and the
emotional reactions to it may also influence the process of coding
others as in-group or out-group members (Hommel et al., 2009;
Iani et al., 2011).
In the present perspective article, we focus on (on-line) JAs
as a way to realize shared goals. Influential studies suggest
that performing successful joint-actions depends on the ability
to: (i) share representations, (ii) predict others’ actions, and
(iii) integrate predicted effects of one’s own and others actions
(Sebanz et al., 2006). Crucially, this definition highlights that
interacting individuals cannot directly access a partner’s motor
plan and thus need to infer it from his/her overt behavior (aside
from environmental cues). Moreover, since reactive processes do
not suffice in supporting the fine-tuned temporal contingency
required by on-line interpersonal coordination, co-agents cannot
simply react to the partner’s behavior but need to predict it
(Knoblich and Jordan, 2003). Predictive coding is (at least
partially) based on predictive sensorimotor processes triggered by
the observation of others’ actions (Kilner et al., 2007). However,
a fundamental question concerns what is actually “shared” of
motor representations during on-line interpersonal interactions.
We suggest that “shared goals” (Butterfill, 2012) create a link
between interacting co-agents by integrating, in a unique motor
plan, the representation of one’s own and a partner’s action (see
also Knoblich et al., 2011).
According to Butterfill (2012), three features of shared goals
are crucial: (i) there is a single shared goal, G, to which each
agent’s actions are (or will be) individually directed; (ii) each agent
expects each of the other agents to perform an action directed to
the shared goal G; (iii) each agent expects this goal G to occur as
a common effect of all actions directed toward it, i.e., both his
or her own and the partner’s ones. Thus, a shared goal is both
“in common” between co-agents and “divided up” into individual
sub-goals that each actor needs to achieve to fully accomplish the
intended JA.
In keeping with computational (Wolpert and Ghahramani,
2000) and neurophysiologic studies (Fogassi et al., 2005; Grafton
and Hamilton, 2007) indicating that the motor system represents
individual goals according to a hierarchical structure, we suggest
that JA and shared goal representations are not independent
from this organization: just as individual muscular synergies
are coordinated in complex actions by the need to achieve a
desired (individual)motor goal, interpersonalmotor synergies are
shaped by the presence of shared goals which organize co-agents’
behaviors (Chersi, 2011; Candidi et al., 2015). In keeping, framing
research on JA as research on actions involving two or more agents
sharing a common goal implies suggesting JAs are characterized by
a “hierarchical structure” where the accomplishment of a (shared)
overarching goal depends on the fulfillment of the sub-goals that
each interacting partner is required to achieve. For instance, the
overarching common goal of moving a table together is achieved
only when both partners accomplish their own individual sub-
goal (e.g., pulling and pushing the table in the right direction) by
dynamically adapting to each other in space and time.
Importantly, the definition of “shared goals” provided above
does not overlap with the one of “shared representations” as
they have been defined by studies on joint attention (Sebanz
et al., 2003, 2005, 2007). Studies on joint attention typically
investigate conditions where one binary choice task with two
competitive target stimuli is split between two participants, with
each participant responding to only one of the targets in turn-
taking because he/she has “his/her own target” to respond to
(e.g., paradigms leading to joint Simon effect, Tsai et al., 2008;
Flanker effect, Atmaca et al., 2011, and SNARC effect, Atmaca
et al., 2008). In these tasks, participants have to attend to one target
and to ignore the other. Thus, in principle their performance
in the joint condition should resemble the one in individual
go/no-go tasks. However, participants involuntarily take the co-
actor’s task into account albeit they are explicitly instructed to
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ignore it. This suggests that humans have a tendency to form
“task co-representations” which specify not only one’s own but
also a co-actor’s task, even if the co-actor’s task is irrelevant to
(or even interfering with) one’s own task fulfillment. Although
the ability to co-represent a task is obviously crucial in JA, the
above studies resemble interference effects reported in studies
on action-perception coupling (Brass et al., 2000, 2001; Kilner
et al., 2003). Namely, they may tap incidental and automatic
(i.e., “passive”) processes recruited when agents act independently
but contingently. Accordingly, it has been suggested that what
participants co-represent in these “task sharing” scenarios is that
another agent is present and when it is his/her turn, but not what
the other agent needs to do (Wenke et al., 2011). On the contrary,
shared goals imply that partners have clear in mind both what
they need to do (i.e., their own sub-goal), what the partner needs
to do (i.e., his/her sub-goal) and their common effects. Hence,
shared goals are “active” ingredients of our motor planning: they
enable co-agents to dynamically integrate predicted effects of the
partner’s action within the agent’s motor plan. In the following
section we will explain why a joint-grasping set-up provides
an excellent opportunity to investigate the hierarchical structure
(where co-agents’ sub-goals depend on overarching shared goals)
that—in our view—characterize motor planning during JAs.
Grasping Kinematics: From Individual
Transitive Behavior to Interpersonal Goal
Sharing
Prehension, i.e., the capacity to reach and grasp, is the key
behavior that allows humans to change their environment, and
it has been largely described both in terms of its kinematic
features (Jeannerod, 1981, 1984) and in terms of its neural
bases (see Castiello, 2005, for a review), thus becoming an
“experimental test-case” for the study of transitive, goal directed
actions (Grafton, 2010). Indeed, prehension is a somewhat
stereotyped movement in which maximum grip aperture (i.e., the
thumb-fingermaximum distance) is a landmark always occurring
at 60–70% of the reach trajectory and highly correlated with
object size (Jeannerod, 1981, 1984; see also Bootsma et al.,
1994; Smeets and Brenner, 1999). Thus, grasping kinematics
follows stereotypical patterns if other factors do not intervene.
Importantly, however, grasping kinematics also depends on its
desired end-goal. In fact, not only objects features (e.g., texture,
weight and fragility; Johansson and Westling, 1988; Weir et al.,
1991; Savelsbergh et al., 1996) but also the intentions of an agent
(e.g., grasping an object to lift it, to place it in a precise location or
to use it, Ansuini et al., 2006, 2008) modify grasping pre-shaping,
i.e., the relative position of fingers during the reaching phase,
and the contact points of the fingers on the object (Sartori et al.,
2011). Finally and most importantly, prehension kinematics is
also modulated by social factors as the co-agent’s communicative
(Sartori et al., 2009; Ferri et al., 2011; Innocenti et al., 2012) or
cooperative/competitive intention (Georgiou et al., 2007; Becchio
et al., 2008a,b; see Becchio et al., 2012, for a review). Thus,
grasping kinematics becomes an ideal candidate to explore how
the socio-emotional context modulates agents’ overt behavior
during realistic face-to-face interactions, by using a set-up where
object properties (i.e., the physical “sub-goal” of each agent)
is kept constant (and cannot thus modulate kinematics) but
the co-agents’ “shared” goal and the socio-emotional context
are modulated instead. Suggestions have been made that the
observation of movement kinematics is what allows an observer
to infer the agent’s intention by simply noting details of his/her
overt behavior (Ansuini et al., 2014; see also D’Ausilio et al., 2015).
For instance, we can distinguish when a given action (say, making
a pass) is used for its pragmatic goal (e.g., passing the ball to
the teammate) or for a communicative one (e.g., signaling to a
co-actor the direction of the pass) from minimal motor cues.
The Implementation of Shared Goals in a
Joint-Grasping Task
Taking advantage from early attempts to apply grasping kinematic
analysis to research on JA, in recent years we developed a joint-
grasping task where each of two individuals sitting one in front
of the other is required to reach and grasp a bottle-shaped object.
The objects provided to each individual are identical and designed
to prompt a precision grip (when grasping a small cylinder in the
higher part of the bottle) or a power grip (when grasping a large
cylinder in the lower part of the bottle; see Figure 1).
Participants are required to reach-and-grasp the bottle in the
correct part following different instructions. Crucially, however,
each participant needs to perform the task as synchronously as
possible with the partner. The more participants are synchronous,
the higher their common payoff. As synchronicity with the
partner is essential to fulfill the instructions—in this scenario as
well as in many daily life situations—Grasping Asynchrony is the
critical dependent variable indexing the success of interpersonal
coordination (Sacheli et al., 2012, 2013).
Four features of this paradigm are crucial. Two participants
are instructed to perform a face-to-face motor task (i) implying
a shared goal (i.e., be synchronous) which is dependent on
participants’ ability to achieve their own motor sub-goals (i.e.,
grasping the bottle-shaped object at the correct location),
and which also implies that (ii) each participant’s motor
sub-goal is dependent on the partner’s action (i.e., the task
requiresmutual adjustments); moreover, in different experimental
conditions, participants have (iii) to perform either imitative
or complementary movements with respect to their partner’s
one, and (iv) to adjust to the partner’s movements either in
time only [“synchronization” (Synchr) condition, requiring to
be synchronous only] or in time and space [“joint action” (JA)
condition, requiring to be synchronous and to adapt to the
partner’s sub-goal]. Importantly, in the JA condition participants
do not know where to grasp the object in advance: both partners
only receive an auditory cue that specifies whether they have to
perform an imitative action (precision–precision or power–power
grip) or a complementary action (precision-power grip or vice
versa) as a couple. As a consequence, they have to reciprocally
adapt their movements on-line in order to select which action
(e.g., precision–precision or power–power grip in case of imitative
actions) they are going to perform based on the movement of
their partner. Thus, although in principle both Synchr and JA
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FIGURE 1 | The figure illustrates how a joint-grasping set-up allows for
investigating the hierarchical structure of motor planning which
characterizes joint action (JA). It represents the JA experimental condition
described in the main text. Here, each agent’s sub-goal (i.e., grasping the
bottle-shaped object at the correct location) depends on the couple’s shared
goal (i.e., grasping the object synchronously and performing a
complementary/imitative action, please note in this case a complementary
action is shown). Namely, co-agents select the to be grasped object-part
according to the shared goal, and perform mutual adjustments in order to fulfill
it. Then, the correct movement (i.e., the recruitment of motor synergies to
perform a precision/power grip) is selected according to the to be performed
sub-goal; however, observing these motor synergies in the partner is a cue in
itself, which allows co-agents to predict the partner’s sub-goal and adjust their
own movements accordingly.
imply a “shared goal” (i.e., be synchronous) according to the
Butterfill’s (2012) definition, only the JA condition would capture
a situation where participants need to predict the partner’s action
and sub-goal in order to select their own action and sub-goal
to achieve the shared goal (i.e., not only be synchronous with
but also complementary/imitative to your partner): namely, JA
requires participants to predict (and represent) what the partner
is doing (see Figure 1). On the contrary, the partner’s sub-goal
might be totally disregarded in the Synchr condition, at least in its
spatial features. In this regard, the Synchr condition implies “task
sharing” and not necessarily “shared goals” (see the distinction
outlined above).
Thanks to such task structure (which includes shared goals) and
the peculiar feature of grasping movements, we have been able
to explore how co-agents’ (individual) behavior is modulated by
socio-emotional variables (Sacheli et al., 2012, 2013, 2015).
In one study, by applying this set-up we showed that a negative
interpersonal perception (induced by the feeling that the partner
has mined one’s own self-esteem, Caprara et al., 1987) strongly
modulates the ability to reciprocally coordinate in JA (Sacheli
et al., 2012, see Figure 2). Specifically, when participants interact
within a negative interpersonal scenario (i.e., negatively biased
group), their performance in the JA condition is significantly
lower than in the Synchr one (Figure 2A), suggesting they act
“each one on their own”: they do not represent the shared goal
and hence disregard the partner’s sub-goal, and this impairs
the performance when mutual adjustments are required (i.e., in
JA). As a matter of fact, the analyses on participants’ movement
kinematics demonstrate that participants’maximumgrip aperture
in JA is less variable, indicating they perform less movement
corrections. This evidence supports the idea that participants are
less prone to represent and adapt to the partner’s action and sub-
goal (Figure 2B). On the contrary, we showed that in a neutral
interpersonal situation pairs of participants achieve the same level
of performance in Synchr and JA (Figure 2A): this suggests they
represent the task as what Vesper et al. (2010) define a “me + X
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B
A
FIGURE 2 | Modified from Sacheli et al. (2012). The graphs illustrate results
comparing behavioral performance in terms of grasping asynchrony (i.e.,
time-delay between partners’ grasp times on the bottle, A) and grasping
kinematics (in terms of maximum grip aperture variance, B) of two groups of
participants. In one group the interpersonal perception is left neutral (Neutral
group), while in the other it is negatively biased (Negatively biased group). (A) In
the Neutral group, participants initially (session 1) achieve the same level of
performance in the synchronization (Synchr) and in the joint action (JA)
condition. On the contrary, in the Negatively biased group, participants’
performance in JA is significantly lower (i.e., grasping asynchrony is higher,
indicating poorer performance) than in Synchr: this suggests they are acting
“each one on his own,” and are thus not able to reciprocally adapt in order to
achieve the JA shared goal. (B) Coherently, analysis of kinematics reveals that
maximum grip aperture is much less variable (indicating less movement
corrections and thus less reciprocal adjustments) in the Negatively biased
group, supporting the hypothesis that they are less prone to adapt to the
partner’s action. However, in the second session maximum grip aperture
variance in negatively biased participants increases in JA. This effect is
paralleled by an improvement in interpersonal coordination as measured by
grasping asynchrony. See the main text for an interpretation of these results. JA,
joint action condition; Synchr, synchronization condition. Error bars indicate
SEM. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
mode,” i.e., including the partner’s movement in their own motor
plan, independently from the experimental condition, namely
even when they are not necessarily required to do so (i.e., in the
Synchr condition).
Hence, a negative interpersonal bond reduces the tendency
to map others’ behavior onto ones’ own sensorimotor system
for the purpose of representing the shared goal of the joint-
grasping task: participant act independently from each other and
do not reciprocally adapt, as if they did not automatically resolve
back to a sensorimotor representation of the partner’s movement
for the sake of shared goal fulfillment. Conversely, this “shared
goal representation” is established in neutral interpersonal
situations.
Importantly, in a second session of the experiment, negatively
biased participants improve their performance in the JA
condition, and this is paralleled by an increase in movement
corrections as shown by grasping kinematics. This suggests
that acting together might itself facilitate the creation of a
social bond between interacting co-agents and change the
way partners represent the task: from representing it as an
“individual” grasping task where two agents act in synchrony but
independently (“task sharing” mode) to representing the task as
a joint grasping task having an overarching, cooperative shared
goal (“shared goal” mode). Accordingly, one might hypothesize
that JA tasks like the one described here might be exploited
to investigate whether acting together reduces biases toward
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other individuals. For instance, we showed that the JA condition
is also modulated by racial prejudices (Sacheli et al., 2015),
as sensorimotor simulation recruited during JA (indexed by
visuo-motor interference measured by the comparison between
complementary and imitative actions) negatively correlates with
the individual ethnic bias (i.e., it is reduced when interacting
with the out-group partner in biased participants only). Studies
indicate that unconscious mimicry of others’ postures and
mannerisms during interactions may have the social scope of
promoting affiliation (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; van Baaren
et al., 2004, 2009), and that the voluntary mimicry of out-group
members reduces racial stereotypes (Inzlicht et al., 2012). In a
similar vein, the reinforcement of social bonds that arises during
prolonged motor interactions (Sacheli et al., 2012) may exert the
same powerful modulation.
Conclusion
The present perspective focuses on the idea that the presence of
a shared goal is what qualifies an on-line interaction as being
penetrable to interpersonal cues. Vice versa, the presence of
shared goals during mutually adaptive interactions may promote
affiliation between interacting individuals by reinforcing their
emotional bond, and this may be reflected in subtle changes in co-
agents’ interactional behaviors that can be captured analysing their
movement kinematics. The present perspective article intends to
suggest that future research on the socio-emotional components
of motor interactions do not necessarily require “complex”
interactional set-up: indeed, even extremely instrumental and
overlearned movements (such as grasping movements) can be
shaped by the emotional context in which interaction takes
place, provided that the interactive task implies a shared
goal.
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